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S586 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE January 19, 1967 
REDUCTION OF US. FORCES IN 
EUROPE 
Mr MANSFIELD. Mr. President. I 
send lo the desk a resolution and ask 
that It be read, along wL. lhe names of 
the cosponsors. 
s. n~,. 40 
Whereas tho foreign policy and milito,ry 
gtrength of the Untted States are dedicated 
to the protection or our national security, 
the prest'rvatlon of the liberties or the Amen-
can people, and the m:untcnance or world 
peace: and 
Whereas the United States In Implementing 
these principles hns maintained hu-ge con-
tingents of American Armed Forces in 
Europe, together with air and naval units, 
for twenty years; and 
Whereas the security or the United States 
and Its citizens remains Interwoven with the 
security or other nations signatory to the 
North Atl.lntic Treaty as It was when the 
treaty was signed, but the condition or our 
European allies, both economically o,nd mili-
tarily. has appreciably Improved since large 
contingents or forces were deployed; a.nd 
Whereas the means and capacity of all 
members of the North AWmtic Treaty Or-
ganization to provide forces to resist aggres-
sion bas significantly Improved since the 
original United States deployment: and 
Whereas the commitment by all members 
o! the North Atlantic Treaty Is based upon 
the full cooperation of all treaty partners 
In contributing materials and men on a !air 
and equitable basis, but such contributions 
have not been forthcoming !rom all other 
members or the Organization: and 
Whereas relations between Eastern Europe 
and Western Europe were tense when the 
large contingents of United States forces were 
deployed In Europe but this situation has 
now undergone substantial change and rela· 
t!ons between the two parts o! Europe are 
now characterized by an Increasing two-way 
tlow or trade, people and other peaceful ex-
change: and 
Whereas the present pol!cy or maintaining 
large contingents or United States forces and 
their dependents on the European Continent 
also contributes further to the fiscal a.nd 
monetary problems or the United States: 
Now, therefore, be It 
Resolved, That-
(I) It Is the sense of the Senate that, with 
changes and Improvements In the techniques 
of modern warfare a.nd because of the vast 
increase In capacity or the United States to 
wage war a.nd to move rnil!tary forces a.nd 
equlpment by air, a substantial reduction or 
United States forces prcmenently stationed 
In Europe can be made without adversely 
affecting either our resolve or ab!l!ty to meet 
our commitment under the North Atlantic 
Treaty; 
(2) s. Res. 99, adopted In the Senate 
April 4 , 1951, Is amended to contain the pro-
visions or this resolution a.nd, where the 
resolutions may conflict. the present resolu-
tion Is contro!Ung as to the sense or the 
Senate. 
The list of cosponsors is as follows: 
Senators YOUNG of Ohio, MORSE, RAN-
DOLPH, Ml.TCALF, PEARSON, JORDAN of 
Idaho, YOUNG of North Dakota, BOGGS, 
INOUYE, DOMINICK, LoNG Of Missouri, 
HATFIELD, ERVIN, LONG Of Louisiana, BYRD 
of West Virginia, HILL, RUSSELL, MAGNU-
SON, PASTORE, SYMINGTON, MUSKIE, HART, 
BREWSTER, TALMADGE, YARBOROUGH, Mc-
INTYRE, BARTLETT, MOSS, PROXMIRE, FuL-
BRIGHT, McGOVERN, BURDICK, ELLENDER, 
NELSON, AIKEN, CARLSON, WILLIAMS of 
Delaware, GRUENING, ALLOTT, COTTON, 
and SMATHERS. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for 
the information of the Senate, I think 
that the total number of sponsors ls 41 
at this point. 
I ask unanimous consent that the res-
olution be referred both to the Commit-
tee on Armed Services and the Commit-
tee on Forei<Yn Relations. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there 
objection? The Chair hears none, and 
It Is so ordered. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
ask unanimous consent that both these 
committees may have authority to ap-
point subcommittees which will act 
jointly. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there 
objection? The Chair hears none, and 
i.t is so ordered. 
The resolution CS. Res. 49) was re-
ferred to the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices and the Commitlce on Foreign 
Relations. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
ask unanimous consent that the resolu-
tion which I have offered today lie at the 
desk for 1 week for cosponsors. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, the resolut,on will be held at 
the desk, as requested by the Senator 
from Montana. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, Sen-
ate Resolution 300 in the 89th Congress 
was intended to express the sense of the 
Senate that a substantial reduction of 
U.S. forces permanently stationed in Eu-
rope can be made without adversely af-
fecting our resolve or ability to meet our 
commitment under the North Atlantic 
Treaty. It will be recalled that the reso-
lution had acquired a total of 32 spon-
sors by the end of the 89th Congress. 
In spite of this substantial interest, the 
leadership decided not to press the mat-
ter to a decision during the closing days 
of the last session. Notice was served, 
however, that the matter would be re-
opened in January. 
Just prior to the convening of the 90th 
Congress, the original sponsors of the 
resolution met to consider a course in the 
matter. After a thorough discussion, It 
was decided once again, with 12 of the 
13 Members assenting, that the resolu-
tion on U.S. troop deployment in Europe 
should be reintroduced without delay. It 
was also agreed that the President should 
be advised of the intention to do so and 
that, on this occasion, all Members of 
Senate should be invited to cosponsor 
the resolution if they so desired. 
I find it regrettable, Mr. President, 
that nothing has happened since the 
close of the last session to Indicate that 
this resolution is any less necessary to-
day than 1t was several months ago. At 
that time, I expressed the hope that the 
introduction of the resolution, of itself, 
might prove to be helpful in,bringing 
about adjustments in U.S. troop num· 
bers in Europe. However, what looked 
like a hopeful move in that direction 
last fall has apparently turned out to be 
merely another exercise in marking time. 
It is my personal belief, therefore, that 
the resolution on U.S. troop deployment 
in Europe is, if anything, more timely 
than it was during the last session, and 
that the Senate is more than ever justi-
fied In coming to grips with the matter 
in this session. Let me review some of 
the specific considerations that have led 
me to this conclusion. 
The request that our forces be with-
drawn from France seemed to provide an 
excellent opportunity to bring home ap-
proximately 70,000 of the 900,000 or more 
American defense personnel and depend-
ents now stationed throughout Western 
Europe. Instead, the Defense Depart-
ment is In the process of moving at least 
two-thirds of these forces along with 
their dependents who have been in 
France, not back to the United States, 
but on to the United Kingdom, West Ger-
many, and the Low Countries. Thus, the 
reduction in overall U.S. personnel levels 
in Ew·ope will be insignificant. I must 
confess, Mr. President, that It is most 
difficult to understand why some air units 
can be moved from France back to the 
States, under a dual-basing concept--
and a few are being moved-but the bal-
ance must be assigned elsewhere in 
Europe. 
It is also difficult to understand why 
we will not face up to the fact that the 
Western European allies are uninter-
ested in stocking supplies and organizing 
lines of communications to sustain forces 
for a hypothetical 90-day conventional 
war on the Continent. Indeed, their 
outlays in this connection are hardlY 
sufficient to sustain their NATO forces 
for 30 days or even, In some instances, 
for 10 days. Nevertheless, the Defense 
Department still clings to the 90-day 
concept, and we pay heavily In terms of 
the number of supporting troops and de-
pots which are required to maintain lt. 
Most disturbing, in my view, has been 
the revelation of the rigidity of our pol-
icy with respect to NATO, as it emerged 
in the recent United States-United 
Kingdom-West German talks on troop 
deployment, strategy, and offset arms 
purchases. These tripartite talks seem 
to have led, as I have already noted, at 
best, only to interim decisions on our 
part to maintain the status quo and post-
pone the hard decisions. Indeed, these 
talks have taken us, if anything, further 
toward a un!lateral U.S. underwriting o! 
the burdens of NATO. 
What was heralded months ago by un-
named sources in this QQvernment as a 
move to get the Europeans to take a 
greater share of NATO's burdens, has 
produced precisely the opposite results. 
Indeed, It Is ironic that the principal de-
cision of the receTJt tripartite Conference 
involves a new U.S. commitment to buy 
$35 m1111on worth or arms and services 
from Great Britain In order to stave off 
the reductions in the British Army o! 
the Rhine which London had previously 
announced It felt compelled to make. To 
put it bluntly, this Conference reveals 
a disconcerting tendency to beg or to bug 
all1es Into a certain view of NATO's cur-
rent needs which is based on a conviction 
of urgency that they do not necessarily 
share. 
It has been said before, Mr. President, 
but it bears repeating: the United States 
Is the only member of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization which has met its 
commitments to the common defense ef-
fort. No member of NATO spends as 
much o! its gross national product on 
defense as does the United States. No 
NATO member has as great a percentage 
of Its available manpower in uniform as 
does the United States. The costly 
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st.nndards or Lrainlng, equipment, staf-
fing and logistics v.hich hav b en maln-
ta ned for the six US dlrl ion on ~he 
European Contlntn h v not b n cv n 
remotdy approached by any other 
NATO nation. 
to t sl mtlcant I should be not d 
only three mcmb rs of NATO, oth r than 
th • United Stnws. t1ll require 2 years 
of compulsory en1ce from th lr army 
draftee . 'The e members nrc Portugal, 
Or cc. and Turkey. Great Brttam ha 
long since abandoned consenptlon en-
tirely as long ago as 1960. Other West-
ern f~uro)~an nations ha\e either also 
ended compulsory rnlllt.ary ~rvice, or 
sharplv reduced the term of their man-
power draft. 
Fnmce no longer sct>s a need to a.o;slgn 
anv forces to NATO or en~n to guaranU'r 
othC'r NATO forces access to French tcr-
rttory. W t Germany has the t'QUha-
lcnt of 8, rather than the committed 12 
divtsions marutcd, equipped and staffed 
Finally, not only Great Bntain, a:; noted, 
but Belguim as \\ell Is anxious to reduce 
lls commttments of troops to NATO. 
Jt set-ms to me tlla t It Is long past the 
time not only to recognize contemporary 
European rcalillcs but to act on them. 
There is no longer any blinking the fact 
that the European governments do not 
feel as imminently threatened from the 
East or by internal upheaval as was the 
case 15 years ago Western Europe is 
consrious of Its stability and confident of 
Its ability to maintain an unprecedented 
prosperity, in part, by expanding com-
mercial and other intercourse with East-
ern Europe and even with Communist 
China. The list of commodities which 
the NATO natwns are prepared to ex-
clude from this trade for strategic rca-
sons grows ever shorter. 
Tlwre is, Mr. Pre.'ildent, obviously a 
growing EuroJ)(!an conviction that an era 
of J)E'aceful coexistence in Europe is 
more than a Jl0..%ibllity for the future; 
for them, 1t is already here. President 
De Gaulle Is most articulate in giving 
expression to this v1ew as wpll as to other 
pan-European concepts. But It is a view 
whtch, in my judgment, finds increasing 
echo In Western Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and other EuroJ)('an 
nations. Indeed. rE'C(>nt official expres-
sions of the policies of our own Govern-
ment suggest a belief in the possibility 
of advancing PE'nce through expanded 
trade and other relations with Eastern 
Europe and a readiness to participate 
actively in a broad Pl'OCt•ss of reconcilia-
tion. A f0elect1ve but substantial reduc-
tion of our troop commitments to NATO 
is not out of step w1th these new probings 
of our PQhcy. IndE'ed, 1t could become 
central to furthering that development 
I do not believe that we must \\a it for 
othe1 s to act first or that we must nego-
tiat~ formal agreements on troop reduc-
twn~ in order to do what is right for thiS 
Nat.wn. The actron,.; of others may or 
may not be reciprocal or syncretic 'lloith 
our own. Both the Western EuroJ)ean 
natwns and the Sonet Union have mnde 
1ndl\1dual nalional decisions of this kind. 
We can do the same if a roouct1on of 
US. forces In Europe w1ll serve--as I 
bellt>ve 1t v.ill-this Nation's Inter ts in 
thf' context of our vital concern in the 
Rl 10 .. 'AL Rl CORD- ~b rA'I 1: s:; 7 
North Atlantic re lou and our c neral 
po Uon tn the v.orld 
There 1S not magic number or US. 
troops "'hlch, Vi hen tnUon ~~ in Euro1 , 
v.ill guarantee a lnst probes from U1e 
East or a r crud scene of mU1 rl m m 
the W t There Is not a magw 11um r 
of U.S troops \\hlch ean underwnte our 
diplomacy and Insure ult1mntc solutions 
of Europe s problems ns w c think they 
should be solved 
A sub tantlal reduct1on m .S forces 
In Europe v.ould sttlllea\e an lmpressne 
U.S. military presence on the Io.'uropean 
Continent TheUS. treaty commltnll'nt 
to the defense of We tern Europe under 
the North Atlantic Treaty \\ould re-
rnam Intact. In that context, tlwre 
\\OUld be no abandonment of mterna-
tlonal responslbllllles and no lm ita ttou 
to pro\ ocallon 
Indeed, v. hat nation would be so fool-
hardy as to believe that a reduction m 
US. forces stationed m Europe 1. e\ 1-
dence of \\eakness or lack of wlll'' What 
nation would be so foolhardy as to con-
clude that the Umted States, which has 
fielded se' era! hundred thousand men m 
VIetnam, on the fringes of its vital in-
ternatiOnal interests. would abandon the 
North Atlantic region which is a corner-
stone of tho<c interests? If there is war 
agam in Euro)Je or over It-make no filS-
take-the United States will be party to 
it, \\ hether· or not there are s1x divi'<ions 
or six battalions of Amcncan forces Ol• 
the European Contment. 
If NATO Is to survive, and I belie1·e 
that v.e should make every effort to see 
that it does survive, the Orgamzatlon 
must be adapted to reflect the changing 
attitude~ and preoccupations of all of Its 
members I am personally persuaded 
that the most urgent adaptatiOn which IS 
reqmred is a reduction downward In the 
US. troop commitment on the Continent. 
In all frankness, Mr. President, I believe 
we should face now the prospect that 
other NATO members In addition to 
Jo'rance mnv also find large contingents 
of Americans on their soil as uncomfort-
ably excessive to need In the not-too-
distant future. It would be wise to an-
ttcipate other invitations to reduce our 
militarv establishment. And insofar as 
I am concerned, it would appear more 
compatible with the dignity of this Na-
tion and more conducive to the main-
tenance of a useful NATO as well as 
overall fnendly North Atlantic relations 
if v. e were to act to reduce our troops 
now of our own volition, rather than in 
a fit of pique under lcs.~ auspicious cir-
cumst.ances. I regret to say that the 
temper tantrums which characterized 
the reactions of unnamed ''official 
sources" in this Government to the 
French request for our withdrawal and 
the earlier Senate resolution on the sub-
ject do not auger well for the future. 
The considerations I have just re-
VIewed, Mr. President, have led me to 
the conclusion that the resolution on 
troop deployment wh1ch is being reintro-
duced today Is both timely and neces-
sary My colleagues may ha'e other rea-
sons for reaching tl.l' same conclusiOn 
I am not unmindful that some would 
hold as perhaps even more Important, 
that a cut in troops In Europe means a 
cut In U ld outfl 
resuii.S from Urf p nc or 
null on American defer 1 ru cl nd 
dependents In rro or Lhnt cut or 
force In rope ould t thl •' tion 
In me tlng I he \Y commiLm nts cl -
"'here In U e "'orld. no bly II \ lctn m 
l\ly o 11 \I\\, 1 reit.cra ,I U ,,t \\llh 
or \\ ithouL n urob!C'nt of In nee uf 
pa) m nts, \\ith or \\iU10ut th • immt•n 
r uln•ments ot \'letnam. the wductlon 
or us fore• in We rn Europe Is Ju li-
fted on Its ov. n merits. lonc-m crdu• 
adJustment Ill US pollry 11. ill. n l>t ct to 
Europe Indeed, I bccau ar. ad,ocn<".Y 
of this cou1se long bcfor< wc b<<"ame lm-
mcn:.ed in the conftlct 111 \'wlnnm or 
deeply concerned with quc,tlons of bal-
ance of pnvrnpn s 
Bef01 ~ closmg, I would like to rraffitm 
U1at the propo ed resolution 1n no \\ ay 
exclude C{)nsultation \\ 1th our NATO 
allies. or \\ ith the SoviC't Union, for that 
rn:\ttN I v. ould bE' less than frank, ho\\-
ever, if I d1d not , tate t.hat I do not 
favor U1e kind of con$ult..at1on that turns 
into a prolong('(} rxt•rcise for dl'ftl nng 
dcctstons and action. 
And before closing, I should also hkr 
to emphns1ze that thts resolution does 
not Intrude in any way on the b:\..~1c n·-
.SI>onstbility of the Pre~ident for the con-
duct of foreign rplalions. Under tl.s 
terms. the Presidt•nt would d1"C1de tlw 
number. nRturr, and t1mhw: of any 1 c-
ductwns in U.S. forces in Euror><• Buc 
make no mistake, if adopted this n>Solu-
tion will express the oobcr adv1cc of t.he 
Senate that the number of US. torc('s 
in Ew·ope should be substantially reduc!'d 
m pres!'nt circumstances. It would 
supercede in this fa.,h1on the advice on 
the same subJ!Cct whtch the Senate gave 
to another Prcsidtnt In 1951-and on 
which he acted-that the US. commit-
ment of forces on the Ew·opean Conti-
nent should be incrl'asl'd from two to 
six divisions in the c1rcwnst.nnccs tll<'ll 
prevailing. In ~>hort, th1s resolutton calls 
upOn those who remain shackled to nn 
outdated policy based on a Europe as 1t 
v. as yesterday to face up to the fact tllM 
tomorrow will always SCE'm to be a bettt·r 
time to take the action whtch 1s w·gcntly 
required today. 
In this connect1on Mr. Prcsidrnt. I 
ask unanlmous consent to have pnnt!'d 
at this point in the REcono an excl'llr.nt 
re::-earch paper done at my ri'Quest by 
Miss Elizabeth Stabler, analyst In West-
ern Europtan Affairs, of the Legislative 
Rcfl•rcncc Serv1ce of the Library of Con-
gress It covers NATO force goals , the 
contnbut1ons of NATO mrnrb rs, and 
the conscnpt1on pollctes of NATO nwm-
bers, as well as otlwr pHtiiiPnt mfor-
matlon. 
I urge Senat01 s to look owr th1s out-
standing study by M1ss Stabler. bccau e 
I think they w11l find much to d1gest 111 
it, and much to wond('r and P0lldl'r 
about . 
I further as~: unanimous cmiSent U!llt 
on page 18 of the resea1 ch paper "'lllch 
I have in my hand. at tht• conelus1on of 
the J)aragmph on Luxembourg, a r.to1 y 
earned In U1r New York Ttrnes on Jan-
uary 12, 1967, be msert.c<i herein at tltat 
point. Furthermore, Mr Prcstdl'nt. I 
ask unanimous cow nt, ro that It 'lloill 
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France: In 1952. France had aLout five 
somewhat undcrstren~th divisions as-
signed to Afcent, with about four of these 
divioions stationed in Germany. Follow-
inrr the outbreak of the Alr;erian rebellion 
in latr. 1954, France in l!J55 and 1956 
wi thd rcw three of these dl visions and 
other units for service in Algeria, with 
the understanding that they would be 
1·ct.urned as soon as po.ssiblc. The de-
pleted French forces in Germany 
amounted to about 112 divisions. These 
divisions were brought up to the strength 
of two divisions when the Algerian war 
came to an end in l!J62. They were 
modernized but were never moved to the 
forward positions required by NATO 
strategy, Other French forces stationed 
in Al ';cria were brought back to France 
but were not reassiQ;ned or earmarked to 
NATO command. 
On July 1, 1966, the two French divi-
sions stationed in Germany-about 60,-
000 mrn-and tactical air units sta-
tioned in Germany-about 10,000 men-
were withdrawn from NATO command. 
On the same date. French personnel as-
signed to the integrated NATO com-
mands were withdrawn. Some of the 
French air units stationed in Germany 
have been redeployed in France. The 
Frrnch and West German Governments 
have recently reached an agreement that 
permits the continued stationing of re-
maininr; French forces in Ge1many on 
the basis of the 1954 London and Paris 
accords and an exchange of letters of 
understanding. NATO and French mili-
tary authorities have yet to agree on a 
mission for these forces. 
The steps taken by the French Govern-
ment on July 1 completed the withdrawal 
of French air. naval. and ground forces 
from Afcent and other NATO commands. 
No French forces are at present assigned 
or earmarked to these commands. In 
March 1959, the third of the French 
Mediterranean ileet that had been ear-
marked to NATO's Mediterranean com-
mand was withdrawn. In June 1963, 
France announced the withdrawal of 
naval units earmarked to NATO's Chan-
nel Command and Atlantic Comm.and. 
In April 19G4, the French Government 
announced the replacement of French 
naval officers assigned to these com-
mands by liaison officers. In recent 
months. the French Gol'ernment has also 
indicated that permission for NATO mil-
itary planrs to fly over French territory 
will be granted on a monthly rather than 
a yearly basis. that France will no long-
er participate in NATO's Military Com-
mittee. and that France will continue to 
make financial contributions only to a 
selected few NATO Infrastructure proj-
ects. The French Government has con-
templated liaison arrangements with 
various NATO and national commands. 
These arrangements as well as ones pro-
viding for French participation in .an 
integrated air defense system covering a 
sector of northeastern France have yet 
to be worked out with NATO author-
ities. 
At present, France has about three 
active divisions stationed In France in 
addition to those in Germany. In 1961, 
the French army numbered over 800,000 
men. By 1966, It had shrunk to about 
330.000 men. This reduction in size was 
in large part a result of heavy expendi-
tures on the development of a nuclear 
striking force. The present striking 
force, consisting of supersonic planes 
carrying 60 kiloton atomic bombs, is not, 
as far as can be determined, coordinated 
with the strategic forces of either Great 
Britain or the United States. 
West Germany: When West German 
rearmament was originally contemplated 
within the framework of the abortive 
European Defense Community, it was 
agreed that West Germany would raise 
armed forces of about 500,000 men in-
cluding an army of about 400,000 men, 
and would contribute 12 divisions to the 
Community. These force goals were car-
ried over into the London and Paris ac-
cords of 1954 under which Germany was 
invited to accede to NATO. Force goals 
for the \Vest German army have be::!n 
postponed or tacitly revised downward a 
number of times, partly because West 
Germany's 12-month period of service 
under the draft-changed to 18 months 
in l!J62-did not permit the raising of 
sufficient manpower. At present, West 
Germany's 12 divisions still suffer from 
a shortage of manpower, and especially 
from a shortage of officers and trained 
technical specialists. For lack of train-
ing areas in West Germany, West Ger-
many's armed forces have also been 
obliged to seek areas for exercises in 
other European countries. Some West 
German military authorities acknowl-
edge that West Germany probably has 
the equivalent of only eight full divisions 
at present. They dispute the claims of 
some American officials that German 
armed forces suffer from serious defi-
ciencies in equipment. With the excep-
tion of a small territorial force-28,000-
and an even smaller reserve for local de-
fense. all of West Germany's armed 
forces-total about 440,COO-are as-
signed to NATO. 
Luxembourg: Luxembourg's army has 
shrunk from about 5,500 men to about 
2,000 men in the last 5 years. The artil-
lery battalion of 500 men attached to 
American forces in Germany consists of 
volunteers. An infantry brigade would 
presumably be available to NATO after 
mobilization. In recent months, there 
has been pressure to disband the army 
entirely and to rely on neighbors for 
defense. 
Netherlands: In the late 1950's, the 
Netherlands reorganized its army to pro-
vide two active divisions instead of one 
active division, and two reserve divisions 
instead of four reserve divisions. In re-
cent years, the size of the army has 
shrunk from about 98,000 to 85,000. In 
addition to two assigned divisions, the 
equivalent. of about two divisions is ear-
marked to NATO command. 
United Kingdom: In the 1954 London 
and Paris accords, the United Kingdom 
undertook to maintain on the Continent 
the four divisions-about 77,000 men-
and tactical air force it stationed at that 
time in Germany, unless overseqs emer-
gencies or a heavy strain on external fi-
nances dictated otherwise. Withdrawals 
would be subject to the approval of Sa-
ccur and a majority of the Brussels 
Treaty powers. In its 1957 white paper 
on defense. the British Government an-
nounced, without apparent preliminary 
consultation with its allies, that it in-
tended to reduce the British Army of the 
Rhine-BAORr--to 64,000 men within 
the next 12 months and ultimately to 
45,000 men, that it would reduce its 
armed forces by almost one half by 1962, 
and that it would rely more heavily on 
nuclear deterrent power. The Govern-
ment anticipated that higher expendi-
tures on strategic nuclear forces would 
require reductions in expenditures on 
conventional forces. It assumed that 
steady improvements in relations be-
tween France and Germany made the 
presence of large numbers of British 
troops on the Continent less urgent. 
After lengthy negotiations with NATO 
military authorities and West Germany, 
Great Britain agreed to limit its with-
drawal.:; from BAOR to 22,000 men. At 
the same time. the British tactical air 
force stationed in Germany was cut by 
one half. Britain's present commitment 
of 55,000 men to the BAOR has been 
variously described as the equivalent of 
2 \13 or 3 divisions. Commitments to the 
dzfensc of Malaysia and disorders in 
some African members of the Common-
wealth entailed further reductions in 
1964. l<'!aving r..bout 51,000 men in the 
BAOR. 
In recent years, British spokesmen 
have consistently argued that NATO's 
force guidelines should be adjusted down-
ward from supplies and supporting 
troops to sustain 90 days of conventional 
combat to supplies and supporting per-
sonnel to sustain 10 to 30 days of con-
ventional combat. In recent months, 
British authorities have been reported to 
have decided on cuts of from 15,000 to 
20,000 men in the BAOR unless West 
Germany agreed to increase substantially 
its contribution to offsetting the costs 
of maintaining the BAOR in Germany. 
The redeployment of some supplies and 
support troops to England would appar-
ently permit cuts of at least 10,000 men. 
For the time being, however, it has been 
reported that all cuts have been post-
poned in view of the fact that the United 
States has apparently agreed to spend 
$35 million more than planned on arms 
and services in Britain in 1967 while 
United Slates-United Kingdom-West 
Ge1man talks on troop deployment. 
strategy, and offset agreements continue. 
The strength of Great Britain's army in 
1959 was about 324,000 men. In 1966, it 
stood at about 218,000 men. 
United States: In 1950, the United 
States had troops amounting to about 
1 \I! to 2 divisions stationed in Europe, 
most of them stationed in West Germany 
as occupation forces. In September 1950, 
President Truman announced that he 
had approved substantial increases in the 
strength of U.S. forces stationed in West-
ern Europe. In April 1951. the Senate 
passed Senate Resolution 99 expressing 
"the belief of the Senate that the threat 
to the security of the United States and 
our North Atlantic Treaty partners 
makes it necessary for the United States 
to station abroad such units of our Armed 
Forces as may be necessary and appro-
priate to contribute our fair share of the 
forces needed for the joint defense of the 
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be easll"!r reading ror Members of the 
Senate, that the entire study be prlnU>d, 
not In Wlnll print, but In the \L~ual size 
print. 
Th PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there 
objection? 1 he Chair hears none, and 
It Is so ord red. 
There being no obJection, the researd1 
paper was ordered to be printed In the 
RECORD, as folloW 
DECEMBJ:R 23, 1966. 
To; Hon MJCHAJ:L MAN FIELD. 
F'rom: Foreign Affairs Dhlsfon, Legisla-
tive Reference Service, the Ubrary of 
Congress. 
Subject. NATO force goals, the contribu-
tions ot NATO memb rs, con cription 
policies of NATO members. 
Clm:D.Al. JU:J.~,\ItltS 
There arc sPvcral diillculllcs in esti-
mating NATO forCl goals and the cxte11t 
to which NATO members have meL their 
commitments. First, it has been the 
lonf{-standing policy of the va1 ious 
NATO commands and of the individ-
ual NATO members to classtfy NATO 
force coals and the extent to which these 
goals have been met. In recent years, 
the United States and Great Britain have 
not always followed this policy in respect 
to their Individual NATO commitments. 
West Germany's comnutment in respect 
to ground forces Is known because it was 
written into agrccmcnl.s preceding \Vest 
German accession to NATO. Neverthe-
less, the commitments and actual con-
tributions of some NATO members have 
been the subjrct ne1ther of officml state-
ments nor of w1official speculation. 
Second, to the extent that some NATO 
ground force goals and the contributions 
of NATO members are known, they are 
usually expressed m terms of divisions. 
But the nwnber or men assumed to a 
division and the nwnbcr v.:ho contnbute 
support to a diVISion vary widely For 
example, Secrcta1-y McNamara recently 
painted out that a dhislon shce in the 
U.S. 7th Army statwned in West Gt:r-
many amount!'Q to about 45,000 men 
whereas a West German division slice 
amounted to about 17,000 men .' There-
fore, a NATO member may well have 
met Its commitments in terms of the 
nwnber of d1vis10ns ass1gn!'Q to a NATO 
command. But these div1 ions may fall 
and log1 t1c~ support that 1s, m terms of 
manpower, staffing, eqwpment, traimng 
and logi.Hics support; that is, in terms of 
general combat rcadmess. MoreovPr, 
especially on NATO's C!•ntral front in 
West Germany, these di\lslons may not 
be deployed as far forward as NATO 
strategy reqmrcs It IS generally be· 
heved that \\lth the exception of the 
US 7th Army, most NATO dlVISIOilS 
show deficiencies m many of these re-
spects Anulable Information howenr, 
doe not permit detailed docum ntat1on 
of this point. 
Tlurd, whereas NATO g10und force 
goals for the central European rctoi-
Afcent-Aihed Force Central Europe-
have been the subJec of many unolllc1al 
pubhshed reports, Coree goal for north-
ern EuroJ>e- Afnorth-and for soullwrn 
• Th~ «ecrelary waa usln~ the figure o: 
nv.- lull dlvtslona and 225 000 m~n lor the 
l S romm m~nt a1 d 12 dhlsl ns and 210-
000 men r r Lhe Y. l Germnn C'Onlrtbul on 
Euror>e-Afsouth-appear to be lnrg( ly 
umeportcd. S mllarly, the dcsir d 
s length n.nd d•·tlclcncles In NATO nn\al 
and &lr forces a1e d1fl cult to c tnbh h. 
Ancl further complicating the task of 
m a urlng national contributiOns again t 
force goals is the d1stlnctwn b(' ween 
forces "a IRned to NATO"-tho com-
ing under the operational command or 
control of Snceur for p£ acet1me t1 nmh 
and dunng emergulcles under condi-
tions aRrN'<I by e:>.ch country-and 
forc<'s "earmnrkc•d for ass1 nment to 
NATO''- thosc forces which natwns 
have agreed to n i n to a NATO com-
mand at some future time-in many 
cases. reserves v. luch v. ould presumably 
be avallabl · only v.:Jtll!n specified pe-
riods aflcr mobilization . The onlr 
forces at ))Icscnt "assigned" to NATO 
a1 e most ground forces ~talioncd in Eu-
rope and some tactical a1r units. Force 
goals and commitment.~ for "earmarked" 
fore ate hlll'.Y Tl1c ext nt to w lu h 
• A ro comm mls cnn oount on m 
• earm rk d force a 1l11n c rnmtt-
m• n 1 u'lclear. 
1 h folio n r ort rrll , on puu !ely 
a\ a liable n d t1 1 ef rt• n• co rll in-
complete mfo1 m lion H include , fir t, 
a tuble 1\ II a ct Unl d br<"akdO'I\ n ot 
rrport d NATO fon·e oats and tho cOm-
mJtm nts and cu1 r• n c 11t1tbuUons or 
NATO mo rnb rs onh for the ror-ouud 
forrP 1.1 1 ned to tht• Crttcinl and n·n-
tral sector that IS, to t\fcent; st·coml, 
tables shouin curnnt contnbutlon of 
!li'Ollnd foJct•s nt Afnorth and AI outh; 
ttm·d, a It tmg ot NATO countllt~ that 
g1n~ a\·atlnble lllfonnnuon on chan o•s 
111 c·on Cl iptlon policio s: fourth, n table 
slto\~ 111 dl'fl'n • expcnd1tuns as a P< r-
crnta e of •ro national produrt for 
't\'IO mcmbns, lllth, n tuble showing 
npprO\:ed NATO Infrastructure co t-
-shal ing formulc.s. 
I. rorn grmls, uahontll rnmmr 1n fils, uutl (I rn' tOtt' ,1, frons In ~1F('f.S.T 
I \1 \I \It\' lOH! F (lOA!~ 'tl~l\11 \I HI ()lila \II' 1 .1>i 10 30 \ 10 F. I> < 1)\lll 11'· 
I!E\IJY lll\'J~I<i Ill! I \I loF 11\1 \' Y 
< tHI't'J t cr, tlr butlon 
Jkl hill ll1•11) 
( II lt 
l'r n('(' l 1 11 \i~1nn 
\\1 l <. rm LilY 1 11.~,4 1'1)111 I (IIJ('fl(, }! Ill\ f.llc 11"1 rJ HI 
~fin) 5lrtll til t1l~ .1houl t••J,"oo 
t'' • 
~tllu rlmd \ t IC'tUt ~ell\ 1 WP. 
I 1~ I <'•I t {t S 
D. AF'<.:ENT FQRCF. COALS 
In February 1952. the North Atlanuc 
Council mcctinr: at Lisbon Is beheved to 
have approved 1954 !UOund force goals 
for Afcent of between 25 and 30 combat-
ready divisions and between 30 and 35 
resprve divisions capable of mobilization 
within 1 month. These goals were not 
even close to being met m 1954, or 111 
1957. Followmg a study by NATO's Mil-
itary Committee in 1956--57-MC-70-
Afccnt force goals for the end of the 
prriod 1958-63 were reported to be Sl't 
at 30 combat-ready diVISions and con-
siderably fewer reserve d1vls10ns. It was 
al~o reporte-d that MC 70 set out a re-
QUirement for lhe stockmg of supplies 
and eqUipment to su&tam these 30 divi-
SIOns m the field for 90 days IL is gen-
eral!\· lx'lieved that only US dl\1 10ns 
have met Uns rcquin•ment. 
Follow mg a new study by NATO s :\111-
llary Conumttre-::I.IC-96-Afcent fore" 
goal for the end of the penod 1961-66 
\\ere repot l<'d to be set at 28 13 com-
bat-rcadv dl\1 ions for tile central front 
lL wa niso repo1 ted howev1~·. that mlh-
tar:y authontws at SHAPE eollllllUt'<! to 
r nrd 30 coml.>at-readv diVISIOns as th<' 
m n1mum requirement for the Cf'ntral 
front .• · lthrr the 28' 1 n~quht•mcl t nor 
the 30-diVIS on requ rcment IJa\e ever 
lx'en met m tem1s of aSSJ 111 d d1 visions 
In April 1965 wh! n W t G~'rmans or-
garuzed and conunttted to NATO ts 12th 
t (1111 tnn th. 
divisiOn, and when F'rnnce still assi1•twd 
two diVISIOnS to NATO command, Af-
cent might be said to have had about 
27' 3 a.~swned divisions. No information 
has lx'en found on present requiruncnts 
fo1· reserve clivi Ions. 
C'. NOTF.S ON .N'\riONAI C'UNTRlUt 1111 $ TO 
1\f'fFNT 
Belgium : BelgiUm s o.rmy has ~hrunk 
in si7.c by about 10,000 men In the last 
5 years. In 1963. four battallons-ubout 
2.000 men-were rrdeploycd from Ger-
many to eastcm Bel 1um. TherP ha\e 
tx-en M!veral rercnt rrports that the Bel-
rnan Crtlvemmcnt has decided to rrque t 
a reductiOn ln 1ts military commllm• nts 
to NATO from six to fow· brigade , or 
from Its two diVISions at pr <ent t1 I'll th 
to tv. o dlV1sJOns at half present su c•n th . 
Two reSNVe diVISIOns are eat mal k~d to 
NATO 
Canada· canada has malllt.ailu d an 
mfnntry bn ade croup 111 Wl'.st Gf rmany 
snce llH• \\1nlfr of 1951 52. Tlw 
stH•n tit or th1 bn adc appears to haH' 
remamed constant Canada matnuur ( d 
12 a1r squad ons m .uropc 111 tJ,e 1V50 
Canadian J squadrons In Euror) now 
number eight and v.11l be rcduc• d from 
ei ht to x when v.o xistlng SQUad-
rollS taLionet1 In France a1 absorbed 
mto IX sqaadrons tatloned In :v l 
G rmanv Tv.:o truantry brlgad roup 
ta loned In Canada ar earmarked for 
d ployment to Europe 
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North Atlantic area," approving "the 
understanding that the major contribu-
tion to the ground forces under General 
Eisenhower's command should be made 
by the European members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty," and approving plans 
to send four additional divisions of 
ground forces to Western Europe. By 
the end of 1952, the equivalent of four 
additional U.S. divisions had arrived in 
Europe, with the bulk of them stationed 
in Germany. 
In April1954, and again In March 1955, 
President Eisenhower declared that it 
was the policy of the United States "to 
continue to main tam in Europe, including 
Germany, such units of its armed forces 
as may be necessary and appropriate to 
contribute Its fair share of the forces 
needed for the joint defense of the North 
Atlantic area while a threat to that area 
exists, and will continue to deploy such 
forces in accordance with agreed North 
Atlantic strategy for the defense of this 
area." President Kennedy, In a Febru-
ary 1961 message to the Permanent 
Council of NATO said: "While relying 
also on the growing strength of all, the 
United States will continue its full par-
ticipation In the common defense effort. 
I am convinced that the maintenance of 
U.S. military strength 1n Europe is es-
sential to the security of the Atlantic 
Community and the free world as a 
whole." President Johnson, in a similar 
message to the December 1963 Minis-
terial Session of the North Atlantic 
Council said: "To NATO's continuing 
fulfillment of this task-that of creating 
a balanced defense posture-r pledge my 
country's will and resources. We will 
keep in Europe the equivalent of six 
American divisions that are now de-
ployed there, so long as they are needed; 
and under present circumstances there 
Is no doubt that they will continue to be 
needed. I am confident that our allies 
will also make their full contribution to 
this NATO defense, so that the burdens 
and reponsibilities of partnership may be 
equitably shared." 
On the basis of the 1951 Senate resolu-
tion and Presidential statements such as 
those cited above, the U.S. commitment 
In respect to ground forces assigned to 
Afcent has usually been described as "a 
fair share" or the equivalent of the ap-
proximately six divisions deployed in 
Europe by the end of 1952-for "as long 
as they are needed." Secretary McNa-
mara, In a June 15, 1966, press conference 
referred to the U .S. commitment as five 
divisions and to the authorized strength 
of U.S. Army forces to support this com-
mitment as 225,000 men. 
The strength of U.S. ground forces 
assigned to Afcent has remained rela-
tively constant since 1952. During the 
1961-62 Berlin crisis about 40,000 more 
U.S. troops were sent to Europe, re-
portedly bringing the total number of 
U.S. ground forces stationed in or near 
Germany to about 280,000. These rein-
forcements have since been withdrawn. 
In the spring of 1966, the Department of 
Defense confirmed that about 15,000 
specialists had been or were being with-
drawn from the U.S. 7th Army for 
service in Vietnam or the United States. 
Secretary McNamara has since said that 
the sending of replacement for these 
withdrawals would be completed by the 
end of 1966. Unofficial reports in the 
spring of 1966 placed U.S. withdrawals 
from the 7th Army In the range of 
30,000 to 45.000 men. The present 
strength of the five U.S. divisions and 
three armored cavalry regiments sta-
tioned in Germany is believed to bP. be-
tween 210,000 and 225,000 men. A farge 
number of the some 56,000 U.S. airmen 
stationed in Europe are also believed to 
be attached to U.S. forces in Germany. 
ll. GROUND FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFNORTH 
AND AFSOUTH: Mll..ITARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF 
PORTUGAL AND ICELAND 
A . AFNORTH 
Denmark: All of Denmark's armed 
forces-about 50,000 men-are reported 
to be either assigned or earmarked to 
Afnorth with standing units of 2% 
infantry brigades and three battalions 
earmarked to this command and some 
active reserve units assigned to the 
command. Denmark's Army totals about 
30,000 and has remained at relatively 
constant strength during the past 5 
years. 
Norway: All of Norway's armed forces 
are reported to be either assigned or 
earmarked to Afnorth with standing 
units of a brigade group and several 
battalions earmarked to this command 
and most reserve units assigned to the 
command. Norway's armed forces have 
decreased in size in the last 5 years from 
about 40,000 men to 34,000 men, with the 
army shrinking in size from about 21,000 
to 17,000 men. Norway is reported to 
have committed itself in 1952 to main-
tain standing units of two full army 
brigades. 
West Germany: One of West Ger-
many's 12 divisions assigned to Afcent Is 
also assigned to Afnorth and is stationed 
in Schleswig. 
B . AFSOUTH 
Greece: Greece has 11 infantry di-
visions, two of which are reported to be 
close to full strength, and one armored 
division. Eight of these divisions are 
assigned to NATO. About 10,000 men 
of the Greek Army are currently sta-
tioned in Cyprus. Greek armed forces 
total about 160,000 men and the Greek 
Army about 118,000. Both the armed 
forces and army have remained at rela-
tively constant strength in recent years. 
Italy: Italy assigns seven divisions and 
five Alpine bridages of 8,000 men each to 
Afsouth. Italy's Army has decreased in 
size by about 30,000 men in the last few 
years and now numbers about 270,000 
men. Italy's total armed forces cur-
rently number about 376,000 men. 
Turkey: Turkey's ground forces total 
16 divisions, four armored brigades, four 
armored cavalry regiments and two para-
chute battalions. Fourteen divisions are 
assigned to Afsouth. Turkey's army has 
shrunk in size in the last few years from 
about 400,000 to about 360,000 men. 
When Turkey bombed Greek Cypriot 
positions on Cyprus in August 1964, it 
withdrew some air units assigned to 
Afsouth. These units were returned in 
a few days, at which point Greece an-
nounced that It would not go through 
with its announced intention of also 
pulling some units out of NATO. 
United States: Several thousand 
marines are believed to be assigned to 
the U s. 6th Fleet which is in the 
Mediterranean and earmarked to 
Afsouth. 
C ICELAND AND PORTUGAL 
Iceland: Iceland has no national mili-
tary establishment. 
Portugal: Portugal has earmarked one 
division of 18,000 men stationed in Portu-
gal to NATO command. It is believed 
that this division is at present only at 
half strength. Most of Portugal's army. 
totaling about 120,000 men, is stationed 
in the Portuguese provinces in Africa. 
One air force reconnaissance squadron 
is assigned to NATO. 
IlL CHANGES IN CONSCRIPTION POLICIES OJ.' 
NATO MEMBERS 
Efforts have been made at various times 
in the past 15 years to persuade NATO 
members to acce!)t 18 months as the 
standard term of service for men 
drafted Into the armies of NATO coun-
tries. There appears to have been no 
period, however, when all NATO coun-
tries with a draft required 18 months 
or more service. Military authorities at 
SHAPE continue to believe that even 18 
months service is inadequate, and that 
the minimum service period required Is 
24 months, in view of the time needed for 
the adequate training of troops in mod-
ern armies. 
Belgium: Military service was extended 
from 12 months to 24 months in March 
1951, reduced to 21 months In August 
1952, reduced to 18 months in May 1954, 
reduced to 15 months in 1957, and re-
duced to 12 months in September 1959. 
Military service is currently required for 
12 months, and for 15 months for certain 
categories of specialists. 
Canada: No compulsory military serv-
ice since the end of World War II. 
Denmark: Throughout the 1950's, 
Denmark appears to have had a 16-
month term of service for army draftees 
and an 18- to 24-month period of service 
for drafted noncommissioned army offi-
cers. In September 1963, the term of 
service was reduced to 14 months for 
men serving In the armored forces and 
signal units, for which formations there 
were enough volunteers. Recently, the 
period of military service has apparently 
been reduced to 12 months for army 
conscripts and 14 months for drafted 
noncommissioned officers. 
France: In December 1950, France in-
creased the period of military service 
from 12 months to 18 months. During 
the height of the Algerian war, the 
term of required service was 27 months. 
This was reduced to 18 months in 1962 
following the reestablishment of peace 
in Algeria. In 1965, France replaced its 
system of universal military service with 
a system of selective service as part of its 
program to modernize and reduce the size 
of the army. The present te1m of service 
is 16 months with the possibility of 
release 1 month early. 
West Germany: West Germany estab-
lished a system of conscription in 1956. 
The terms of service was set at 12 
months. In September 1961, this term 
was extended by 3 months on an emer-
gency basis. In February 1962, the serv-
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Ice unn was xtcnded to 18 months, 
v. hlch Is the requirement today. 
nr Th term of nice cun~nUy 
rC'qulrcd In the arm~ I 24 months, Wlllch 
em to ha\ e b n the term required 
!nee at lc t 1959 
Iceland. o nai10nal military c tab-
11 luncnt 
Italy: The requh d t.ctrn of scnlcc In 
Ut rmy was 18 months m l!l59. In 
Oc obrr 1962. this term \\as 1 educed to 
15 month, which Is the clllreut rcqnhe-
nwnt 
Luxembourg. In 1959. Luxembourg re-
quhed 12 month cnice for men draft-!'d 
IIlLo tlw army This t('rm v.as r duced 
to 9 months In Augu L 1963, and reduced 
to 6 mon hs as or January 1, 1966. In 
Novl'mhcr 1966, th('re \\as a govcrnmPnt 
cri Is as a re ult of an order to draH 400 
men Into the army The Socialists have 
urged an Immediate end to the draft. 
The Cltr! tlan Soclahsts favor ending the 
draflin July 1967 after consultation v.llh 
NATO anthorlties. There are also pres-
. urcs to d1sband the army entirely. 
[F'rom the New York Tlmcs, Jan. 12, tnG7J 
.LfVVQ ON:-J O.L !>llnOBW'<X l'J .. 
"LUXf'M80VRG, January 10 CReutersl .-
LUX I mbourg, v.hich contributes an army 
of 1.800 drartrcs and 500 volunteers to 
lh!' North Atlantic Treaty Organlzation, 
will abolish the draft, Premier Pierre 
Werner •aid Tuesday. He said In Par-
liament that his new Catholic-Soclali~t 
Government would nev:otiate with NATO 
on the future role of the Luxrmbourl!" 
Army. planned as a for<:e of BOO regu-
lars." 
Netherlands: The required term of 
military service appears to have been 18 
months for nonspecialist low-rank army 
draftees In the late 1950's. In the early 
1960's this term was apparently extended 
to 20 months for the same category of 
draftees, and then reduced to 18 months 
In October 1963, still for the same cate-
gory of draftees. Longer penods of serv-
ice were required for other categories. 
Recently, terms of service In the army 
have been reduced to 16 months for some 
cate ories and 18 months for other 
categories. 
Norway: In March 1954, Norv.ay in-
creased the term of sen ice required for 
army draftees from 12 to 16 n:onths. In 
1963, the term of service was reduced to 
12 months, which is the current r~.;quire­
ment for army draftees. 
Portucal; The current required term 
of sen·ice In the army Is 18 months for 
some catc~;orles and 24 months for other 
categories. Tills reqmrement has been 
In effect since at least 1958. 
Turkey: Turkey currently requli"E.'s 24 
months cnice for army draftees. This 
requirement has b~en 111 effect since at 
least 1959. 
Unlt.('d Kingdom: In the 1957 v.hite 
paper on defense, the British Go~ern­
ment announced Its intention of abolish-
Ing compulsory military scnice by 1962, 
If volunteer recruitment for a signifi-
cantly • mailer army was satlsfactor). At 
the time of the white paper, the required 
t.erm of en·tce In the Br!Ush Arm· ~as 
24 month . This continued to be the 
required term of sen·tce until No\ ember 
1960, when callups for army service 
ended, 2 years earlier il1an anUclpat.ed. 
Grc t Britain continues to h \e a small 
arm • cmcrccnc resc e of 11 000, ln 
v.hlch some men v.ho completed their 
national sen1c unC:er the old ssst m 
'1111ll n e unUI \ oluntary 1 ecrultment 
r ·aches n at! actory lc\ I. Other\\ I 
\ olunlary military sen 1cc 1., completely 
Ill rtf t·Ct 
nitcd ~tates: Uncia the Sci cti\'e 
Scn1re Act of 1948 army draft<· v.cre 
ri'Qulrcd to serve 21 months. This penod 
of .I' I\ 1cc was inc1 ea.cd to 24 months 111 
1951, and has remamed at 24 months 
C\ er I;IIlCe. 
IV Drtcnsc czpcnditurr1 of NATO mcm rr. 
n p cent of gro • rn~tlonal product 195 , 
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U 8 Oepo.runent or S te American For-
eign Pol 11 195(). 1955 \'ol I Part& I IX 
.S Qo.- rr.mfnt I nn n 
P..U.T l\ 
c turtles 1.01 d n 
66 n67, 11 •r. 
rART "t: 
U r 11ou c Commftlrr. on Go 
rmmcnt Op rations An lm tl II n or 
US partlc- p Uon In the !'.'ATO common In· 
frru; ructur • progrnm f rty·f fth rt'por 
Wa.shlngt.on US Oo~crnment PrlnUng Of-
Ike. 1066 30 p (89th c• ngreu. 2nd S -
alon. Howe rteport ·o 2323). Set! p 27 
Mr. JACKSON. fr, Plc !dent, will 
the Senator y1eld? 
Ur. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I com-
mend the able nnd dlstlngul hed ma-
jority l!'adcr for hi action today In &ug-
gezt:ng the refenal of the Senate resolu-
tion to the Foreign Relations Commitll'C 
and to the Armed Service' Committee. 
As Is well known. all of us In this body 
do not agree on the Issues ral~ed by this 
resolution which go to the very heart 
of the military balance that the West 
has worked so long and hard to constmct 
I think we might all agree, however, thnl 
these vi tal matter cannot be settled 
hastily, and should not be considered 
lightly, and that It Is v.:l.o;e and proper 
to follow the regular procedures of the 
Senate. 
I therefore support the suggestion of 
the majority leader that this resolution 
be referred to the Foreign Relations and 
Armed Services Committees. In that 
way, the resolution can be considered 
along v.lth other points of view and re-
lated r!'solutlons and In the light or full 
testimony from the appropriate officials 
of the executive branch, Including the 
Joint ChiC'fs of Staff. 
In this connection, I ask unanimous 
consent that a. speech which I made 
before the Military Committee of the 
NATO Parliamentarians' Confrrence on 
Novemuer 15, 1966, entitled "The Will 
To Stay the Course," be printed in the 
RECORD at this point. 
There being no objection, the speech 
was ordered to be printed In the REcORD, 
ns follov.:s: 
TH& WrLL To STAT TH& Coullllll 
(Speech by Senator Henry M. Jackson, be-
fore the ~Uiltary Committee, NATO Par-
liamentarians' Conference, Paris, France, 
November 15, 1900) 
I 
My home Is In Wn.shlngt.on-not Washing· 
ton, D.C. but the State or Wa.ahlr.gt.on. To-
kyo Is an overnight flight from Seattle 
Saigon is a r~w hours farther rou•b. To 
u.s who live along the Pacltlc the war In Vlct-
nrm, !Ike •he WfU' with Japsn that I> gnn 
25 years ~o next month, seems very cl06e. 
and our s nd there \'ery Important. 1 diJ 
not a.ak you to agree, but I hope that a.a 
friend among friends I may II: ~ou to try 
t.o understand our po~~IUon 
We a.re deeply committed We ha"e com-
mit ed very large ma.terlal reaourcea and, 
more Importantly, many thousands of our 
young men We have not lightly atll:.ed 
them t.o Il:Ulke their aa.crJftc-,..a, Analtogles 
with the put may be mlaleadlng and I would 
nc.t argue that this 1a the 30 s all o~er ng n 
But 1 king back v;e think. a.a I am sur" 
m.&ny C>f )OU do, hat I La wtu t.o atop ag-
g•e&~~ on !ore tbe aggresaor ~ &l.ronil 
and swollen wtt.b ambiUon from amaU sue-
We think the world ml ht haa 
been p red enormou. mlator unea l! Japnr. 
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hnd not been permitted to succeed 1n Man-
churia, or Mussol!ni 1n Ethiopia, or Hitler 
In C7.cchos!ovak1a or 1n the Rhineland. And 
we think tha t our sacrUl.ces 1n this dirty 
war In 11 ttle VIetnam will make a dirtier and 
bigger war less likely. It ts on that basl.8 
tha t we ask young Americans to tlgh t 1n the 
jungles and mountains or VIetnam. 
I am or course deeply concerned about 
VIetnam, as most or you are and as most 
Americans are. We have honestly tried to 
convey our readiness to stop the fighting on 
terms as consistent with the Integrity or 
North Vietnam as they are with the Integrity 
or South VIetnam. We would much rather 
make peace than war. 
In a long run sense, however, I am not 
anxious about the outcome 1n VIetnam. 
Our goals are 11m1 ted and our forces are 
strong. I am confident that In time the ad-
versary w111 see the advantage to hlm In a 
settlement that involves net ther the conquest 
nor the surrender or either side. 
I am certalnly not anxious about the At-
lantic AIUance, but In the long view It Is at 
the center or our concerns, !or It Is on what 
happens here, In this community, that the 
world's prospects !or peace with freedom and 
justice chiefly depend. 
The strength and confidence of the At-
lantic ames remain the single most decisive 
factor In world atralrs. 
It was with this fact In mind that a United 
States Senate subcommittee, whlch I have the 
honor to chair, thls year held a major set or 
hearings on the Atlantic Al1lance. It was 
with thls same !act In mind that I opposed 
In the Senate the h asty passage of any reso-
lution relating to American forces In Western 
Europe that might; be Interpreted- by allies 
or adversaries-to mean a reduced American 
1n terest In Europe. 
n. 
The member states of the Atlantic All!ance 
may take Justifiable pride In their basic 
policies In the years since World War ll. 
Their historic a ssociation In the Marshall 
Plan and In the North Atlantic Treaty have 
transformed the weakness or the late 40's 
Into the strength of the 60's. North America 
and Western Europe have enjoyed an un-
paralleled period or prosperity and growth. 
They have used their strength on several 
occasions to resist aggression against the 
small and the weak; they have used their 
prooper!ty to support large programs or as-
sistance to the poor. They h ave taken long 
strides toward the creation of a European 
economic community- a process that Is o! 
course !ar from complete. Together with 
Japan and other countries they have reduced 
barriers to trade and developed Impressive 
practical measures or International monetary 
cooperation- and In these fields also more 
history 1.s In the making. 
During these years the defenses o! the At-
lantlc A!Uance h a ve been greatly strength-
ened, both absolutely and relatively. The 
shl!t In the b ala nce or power since 1949, 
coupled with firm reaction to Soviet testlngs 
or our resolve- from the first Berlin crisis to 
the Cuban missile crisis-has produced a re-
markable and hopeful stabilization In Europe. 
The rears that seized sober men less than two 
decades ago have quieted down. No armed 
attack has been made on Western Europe, 
and l! we maintain an appropriate balance of 
forces and a firm resolve, none Is likely. Our 
hopes that a genuine European settlement 
will one day be attained rest on Soviet recog-
nition or, and respect !or, the durability or 
this balance, the constancy o! our resolve, 
and. It should be added, the restraint we have 
consistently shown In the use or our power. 
A traditional saying has It that "where 
there's a will , there's a way." Our experience 
In the Atlantic Alllance confirms lt. We hnd 
the will to turn weakness Into strength and 
we have. We had the will to be both firm 
and restrained In the tests to which we have 
been subjected. The combination has been 
the foundation or peace In the Western world . 
The question now Ia whether we have the 
will to persist In our efforts. I! the wind 
from the East blows warm !or a time Instead 
o! cold, w111 we shed our NATO cloak? We 
see among some young people and even 
among some who are old enough to know 
better a temptation to assume that because 
no attack has been made, no defense Is neces-
sary. Aesop would appreciate a logic that 
concludes that because what we have been 
doing has worked, we can safely quit doing It, 
Security, as we all should know, Is not a 
condition; It Is a process. 
The circumstances of 1966 are not the cir-
cumstances or 1949. As times change, the 
Alliance can and should adjust. But the all-
important question remains the same; to 
paraphrase Winston ChurchUI, It ts this: 
will the Atlantic allies stay the course? 
m. 
The tasks of deterrence and defense stretch 
on ahead, therefore, as far as any of us can 
see. We do not know what Soviet Intentions 
are, and neither does the Soviet government. 
Intentions are not airy abstractions. They 
are what one Is actually going to do. And 
what one Is going to do ts always shaped 
in part by how one thinks the other fellow 
can and wUI react. I! there Is little danger 
of a deliberate and massive Soviet attack, 
It Is In part because the Soviet government 
dares not assume that an attack would not 
be strongly resisted and, 1! pressed, that It 
would not qUlckly lead to a nuclear response. 
We cannot have the same confidence, how-
ever, that the Soviet government will refrain 
from exerting political pressures, or manu-
facturing local crises, or probing here and 
there to test our will or to exploit a local 
opportunl ty. The danger Is that any such 
action could grow to dangerous proportions. 
Soviet forces are stUI sta tloned In the cen-
ter of Europe, as are Western forces. In 
terms or numbers or NATO and Warsaw Pact 
ground forces effective enough to be quickly 
employed In the central European area, the 
ratio Is roughly 7 to 10 In favor o! Soviet and 
satelll te troops. 
Central Europe Is therefore, as It has been, 
an armed camp, where large forces equipped 
with the most powerful weapons or war con-
front each other across an arbitrary boun-
dary that no one thinks pemanent. We can-
not be satis fied with a stabilization that rests 
on this foundation. 
Furthermore, the evidence Indicates thnt 
the Soviet government Is gambi!ng enormous 
scientific and material resources on the 
chance that It may be able to seore a decisive 
advance In weapons systems. It now has 700 
to 750 MRBM and IRBM launchers, mostly 
located ne .. r Its Western borders and tar-
geted on Western Europe. According to So-
viet rnllltary leaders their strategic offensive 
and defensive nuclear weapons systems have 
been quantitatively Increased and qualita-
tively Improved In the last !ew years. Their 
underground nucleo.r test program and mis-
sile testing program lend support to these 
claims-and plainly the Soviet government 
does not accept the Idea that military t ech-
nology has reached a platenu and that the 
present balance o! forces cannot be upset. 
I take It !or granted that the Soviet gov-
ernment will do all It can to reduce the 
American lead In nuclear weapons sys tems-
a lead that provides a reassuring margin or 
safety for all o! us. I also take It !or granted 
that prudence requires the American gov-
ernment to fully Implement the safeguards, 
spelled out during Senate consideration o! 
the nuclear test-ban trenty and agreed to by 
the President, to Improve Its capabilities. 
It is our profound common hope that ways 
can be found to turn events ln a happier 
direction . There must be a better way to 
nssure the legitimate security Interests or 
both sides than to maintain an armed camp 
In Central Europe. If and when the Soviet 
government sees an advantage In reciprocal 
reductions In forces, th!.s could surely be done 
so as to advance the leglt!mnte srrurlty In-
terests o! all concerned. 
IV. 
For some time the allles have been dis-
cussing allied troop levels and burden-shar-
Ing. The danger Is that what begins as a 
review might end In bickering, loss or mutual 
confidence, an d weakness- unless we proceed 
very carefully and In full awareness of the 
Importance or not putting In )eopnrdy the 
hard-won mill tnry balance. 
This range of problems Is now under dis-
cussion by the British , German, and Amer-
ican governments, with the asslstnnce or the 
Secretotry Genernl of NATO. I hope thnt 
certain guidelines will be observed as these 
discussions proceed : 
One. A subst...'1ntial American presence In 
Western Europe Is a key to stability. The 
main purpose of the American troop commit-
ment Is to leave no doubt In the Kremlin 
that the United States would be Involved, 
deeply Involved, !rom the outset or a move 
against Western Europe. It needs to be clear 
that Russian forces would meet enough 
American forces to mnke the engagement a 
Soviet-American crisis, not just a European 
one. This means, In my judgment, that a 
token American force Is not adequate. It 
should be an effective combat force, not Jt"t 
something to be tripped over. but a force 
capable or putting up a serious fight. 
Two. The adequacy or allied conventional 
forces should be measured In terms of their 
ability to meet and contain sizable but less 
than all-out attacks by conventional forces 
of the Soviet bloc. 
The allied conventional forces, like the 
American component, are not present In 
Western Europe as a kind or hostage whose 
destruction would trigger a nuclenr response. 
No one, surely not the Soviet government, 
can suppose that a massive assault on West-
ern Europe could be even briefly restricted to 
conventlonnl forces. Indeed, the Idea of a 
big conventional war Is so tar-fetched that 
we do not need to prepare for that contin-
gency. I! a massive attack Is to be made, 
It wi11 surely begin with a nuclear strike 
against Western Europe and North America. 
not a movement of great armies across We~t­
ern boundaries. 
No, the real political and military function 
of allied conventional forces Is to resis t and 
contain a limited attack, thereby confront-
Ing the adversary with the choice or cnlllng 
It otr or of enlarging It, with all the risks 
the latter course would Involve-In partic-
ular, of course, the risks o! provoking tho 
employment of the American Strategic Air 
Command. 
It Is time to put aside the unrealistic force 
goal or enough conventional NATO forces 
to meet and contain whatever conventlonnl 
forces the Soviet Union could order Into 
action. 
At the same time. however. nothing less 
than a force capable of containing a sizable, 
though ltmlted, attack Is adequate, for a Jess-
er force would tempt the Soviet government 
to test the all!ed will, and would confront the 
allles with the choice of backlng down or 
Initiating a general nuclear war. 
In a crisis we need to be able to deploy 
at once military forces strong enough to hold 
rather than give ground, thus Improving our 
diplomatic pooltlon. This Is one of the les-
sons we have learned tn Berlin. I am re-
minded of what General Norstad sal<.l at the 
hearings before our Senate subcommittee 
this year : 
"It ts argued In some places that conven-
tional forces were things of the last war or 
even or the 1914-1918 war. I was In a pool-
tion to 'supervtse' the part o! our forces In 
the Allied Forces during several confronta-
tions In Berlin. The movement or troops, 
the wllllngnesB to use or comml t troope, wa.s 
an important Item. I Just do not think we 
could have met those requlremente lf we hnd 
not had the conventional forces we hnd." 
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Tl ,.,., It Ia I Ule head-coun of 'ATO'a 
con"·n~ onal !ore Ulan Ulelr oomt>nt pa-
btl t} t.ha~ counta 
A the 14 adju t to l.be f renc:h v.1 thdro."' al 
!rom NATO I ~hlnk w can make aome sav-
ln ln British and Amt'rlcan log! tic and 
upport <'lcmenta ln Eurore wHhout ~rltlc­
lr ~ c mb t st.rcncth 
l<>roo,er, In Ume, t.cclmologlcal a.<l\anc 
m r permit aomo roouctJon ln tho number 
or American and Brtll h forces garrisoned on 
~he con~lnent v.ithl,ut a reductJon or t.he 
pov.cr that c: n bA brought 1.0 l>t\ar In an 
emergency. Dc\l!loillnMlt6 ln strategic mo-
bll•ty, both air and £ea. oomblned v.lth the 
prepo~~ltlontng o! suppllC6 1\nd equipment, or 
"dual b:lSlng," hold out ~he poo..~lblllty or 
quick reaction oter hundrooa and evon thou-
sand.<; or m.tl<-'6. 'I11ore hl\ve aloo been re-
markable lncreAAeS lu oonvcnUonal fire power 
and t.actJCJ\1 moblllty which have yet to be 
fully exploited by our NATO forccs. 
But any act.lon MSOCiat.cd v.1th these tech-
nological ad,·ances &hould be taken only arter 
earne&t, thorough conslderat•on or how reli-
ance on t.be60 development.~ v.111 a.tl'ect prC6-
ent. capabilities In the field o.nd the Western 
bargaining position vts-a-vts the Ea.<t. We 
all need to take a careful look at the evl-
dcnc Including a.n up-to-d!\t<l, realistic ap-
praisal of the Soviet ru>d Ea.bt European s1 t-
ua.tlon. We shOuld certainly not be lmpre66Cd 
by unsubstantiated rumors-no matter what 
their lofty sour~ t.ha.t Soviet troop& t.n East 
Germany and Central Europe have be<ln re-
duced and th<>.t So•·lct Intentione are ln-
crl.'aatngly pel\Ccful. Hopes and rumors are 
a very dangerous diet! 
Four. A roouctlon or NATO's conventional 
forceo in Western Europe should be llnked to 
a l'('ductlon or force levels on the other side. 
A major and ns yet unachlevoo purpooe or 
tho Atlantic Alliance Is to reach a. genuine, 
stable Europcan .ACttlemcnt wlth the Soviet 
Union. Among other things, such a. settle-
ment wHl Involve the return or Soviet torceo 
1.0 the Soviet Union. How can the Soviet 
government be encoumged to move In thts 
direction? Certainly not by throwing away 
basic el~menta or our bargaining p051tlon 
through one form or another ot unilateral 
ctltbacl< or diRCngagcmcnt. Surely we should 
retain the bargaining pnsltlon we havl" 
worked so long and hard to con.•t.ruct, and 
actively pursue acccptanC<l or gradual and 
balanced revisions In forces on both sides. 
Fu·e. The actual mix or o.llled forces In 
W~tcrn Europe should underlJne the fact 
that the commitment to the de fellS<! of West-
en> Europe ls tn1ly a. collective Atl!\ntlc com-
mitment. British, Belgum Dutch, Canadian. 
Amertca.n. German and. whenever relln.ble n.r-
rangementa nre po681ble, Fren~h troops, are 
ne<'ded In the central region for this purp<J6e, 
just as combined forcf.'s and commands arc 
nl'('<led m othH regtons for thr same purpo.s<! 
Furthermore, in the very Important central 
rf'gtOn H v.·ould he unwise for any one nation 
to provide a d1 proportionate sha.re. Our 
Germ. n frtcnds v.111 not misunderstand us tr 
we hn\e Germany e>pcclally In mind A dts-
proporUonate Grrmn.n contribution runs 
counU'r to the gonl of strengthening En.stern 
Europ~·s conftdenr~ In NATO s purj)OIIf'S It 
could lso complicate the problell11! of thr 
Germana them..elvee In v.orklng out v.1th 
the1r nt'lghbora nd Msoclalt's the future 
roll' of German} 111 Europe. 
S z TI1e mix of for es Is clOfl('ly related <> 
the problt>m or nchte\ In a more ri!'A.SOnnble 
allocntion or deft'nl'e burdens among the al-
lu'6 When we c<>nsldcr natloll!ll shares m 
thl' <'<'Onomlc burdens o! defending the 1\ort.h 
AtL'l.Ht.ic are.. lnequttles are nppa.rtnL The 
hurdtm clearly falla more hcll\lly on 110me, 
lncludmg the United States, th n the olhers 
I l<nrno·, or course, th t s 1 1on 111m:. If 
oould n t de• 1se a r rmul" for urden-&har-
ln lhnt would ~m completely lair 1.0 e\cr -
on~ A• d In nn\' there Ia a Fohor e or 
Solom ""'· We must therefore de 1 v.l h the 
proolcm 1ves, nd the probll'm Ia one 
t.hat challeng our Ingenuity, our ... nse or 
tn.lrn • and our r.ln rttr In ll\ing up 1.0 
our obligation under Article 3 of our treaty 
for ' continuous and elfect.ive self-help nnd 
mutual aJd" 
The words or thnt obligation v. ere carefully 
u<~>d tn the order or ~heir Importance· "&elf-
hf'lp and mutu!\1 aid" Countrles that are 
cl <$l to the front ltne cannot In reality 
expert a country thll Is rurther away to ex-
tf'nd mutual aJd unless there Ia some evi-
dence of suhstauUnl self-help. When Ulat 
Foell -help Ia not reasonable 1ll amoun when 
In some 001<es It ndda up 1.0 doing almO&t 
nothing-It ls dllllcult In a country further 
away from the rtsk to achieve strong or brood. 
support for mutu11.1 ald . Inevitably the de-
mands grow to do less 
I have used my Influence. such as It Ia. In 
support of mamtalnlng a. substa.n.tla.l Amert-
cun combat !O<"c~ In Western Europe. I know 
that moot or you share my view of the Im-
portance of such a. force. But lt will become 
Increasingly difficult to maintain Aroerlca.n 
support f•>r those or you on thts side or the 
Atlantic who want such a force unlcss you 
are also prepared 1.0 a.ccept a. greater share 
of the coota of protecting the North Atlantic 
area. 
In the twenty years since the war Ameri-
cans have contributed over $120 bllllon to the 
economic and military restoration or what 
we call the free world Con tro.ry to the views 
o>eprcssed by some o! our critics we do not 
expect gm\.Jtude for this, But to a growlng 
numbf.'t' or Amenca.n cltlz.en.s It seems that 
there should a.t least be understanding that 
when heal~h and ea.rnlng power are restored 
we should not be exp<!eted to continue to 
bea.r more than a reason!\ble share oC th.e 
burden 
A substantial United Statee presence ln 
We tern Europe w111 not be brought to an 
end by our adversa.rlea, but lt can be en-
dangered by our friends--by !allure on 
their part to realize the burden the Ameri-
can cl Wz.en ha.s borne and the frame or mind 
he Is in when he sees allies that are strong, 
healthy, nnd with an earning power growing 
a.t a rl\te exceeding Ills own, who are not 
contrtbuUng proporLionawly to the costs or 
the common defense. 
The problem 1s bound to be or concern for 
my country because or our major expendi-
tures for defense o! other areas In the world 
or lmportan.ce to all free nations. At a mini-
mum It does not seem unreasonable to us 
to expect that our contribution In the At-
1 •n tic a.ren should no longer Impose a heavy 
drain on our monetary reserves. 
I know that some or the allies have partic-
ular econom1c problems---balance or IX'Y-
moot dltllculttes or budgetary dilemmas--
which seem to Impede the contrtbutlon of a 
!a.lr share And prosperous as we are, none 
Of U3 h ,IVe r<"SOUrceo to SQUander. Of COUT"e 
v.e want adequate defense at as low a C06t 
as we can mr<n g . The point to be empha-
sl><"d 1& th.<t the economic problems ln-
e\ltabl} lnvol\e a fundamental polltlcal 
probiPm · to devl e burden-sharing and other 
arrnngen1ent.a wr.Jeh wtll support ralner t..Ila.n 
up l't """ lntt'lliRtnt llllocatlon of defense 
ta5ks among t<lltcs 
v 
In the months :.nd } ears that lie allead 
thl' Atlan 1c Allt.a.n~ wtll undergo many 
ch:mgcs. It must I! I~ Ia to ""n·e the pur-
poses alld Interests of the members. It ha.s 
o!len hcen snld not nlwnys with Justice but 
w th enou •h truth to make It sting, that 
gene• Is prepare !or the l!Ut war It could 
he ld "'1 h P<"rhapa equal justice and truth 
that poll ct ns and dlplomata of!Rn havr 
heir e}e& on the problenu or the p:t.P.~ rather 
Ul n the future The A antic A1llanc~ .,.. ... 
f~rv. l-1 • klng In ll'49 It ahould be 
<'qually !orv;ard I lr. ng In 1966. 
I t.ake It U1M our Fren~:oh !rlend~ hAve 
decided to H It o 1t •n the aldellnea tor 
awhllr That Ia theJr df'~ 51 n Tb~ r l o! 
u contlnut' t<> think that our U.SOClBUon In 
NATO and 1~ lnt<'ruaUonnl t'Onunand& &H\N 
our vlt.nl ln~rt' t6 
1 personally c.anno lms.gtne a time v.'llen 
Of' circum t.a t<' In .., hlch, the Alii net' v.lll 
be obsole• n ana.chr< nl&m u e th~ 
future, 1\4 I t'e It, will be tlllt>d "'lth IA&ka 
nnd challrngN v.·e csn but m(>f't not In lao:>la • 
Lion but In a.saoclatlon 
Let mt' conclude, thrre!orr, with tht' pro-
round hope that the dlalogur IUllong all th~ 
allied peopiNI wlll continue t.n the eplrlt or 
genrf061ty and goodwill that ahould be round 
among friends, and thtl.t Ia the vital apt\rlc ot 
nn aaaocll\tlon lhl\t haa done much gOOd fnr 
all or u ... nd we may add, for thf! world-
and that can accompllah much more, nlly, 
must a.ccompllsh murh more It we a.re all to 
piny our part In creating a world In which In-
dividual liberty can aun·he and tlourlah 
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